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It is a common—often stereotypical—presumption that Europe is secular
and America religious. Differences in international religious freedom and
religious engagement policies on both sides of the Atlantic seem to con-
firm this “cliché.” This article argues that to understand why it has been
easier for American supporters to institutionalize these policies than for
advocates in the EU, it is important to consider the discursive structures
of EU and US foreign policies, which enable and constrain political lan-
guage and behavior. Based on the analysis of foreign policy documents,
produced by the EU and the United States in their relationship with six
religiously diverse African and Asian states, the article compares how both
international actors represent religion in their foreign affairs. The analy-
sis reveals similarities in the relatively low importance that they attribute
to religion and major differences in how they represent the contribution
of religion to creating and solving problems in other states. In sum, the
foreign policies of both international actors are based on a secular discur-
sive structure, but that of the United States is much more accommodative
toward religion, including Islam, than that of the EU.
Introduction
Religion has often been perceived as a dividing line between Europe and the United
States. Academic publications on the transatlantic divide are full of anecdotes and
examples from both scholarship and public media that purport a division between
“secular Europe” and “religious America” (e.g., Howard 2011, 2–4; Waldschmidt-
Nelson 2013, 319f). Whereas most of them refer to domestic politics, occasionally
this “cliché” (Berger, Davie, and Fokas 2008, 9) is also borrowed to explain a transat-
lantic rift in how international relations are understood (Solana 2003). Transat-
lantic comparisons to assess whether and how such a religious divide becomes ap-
parent in European and American foreign policy are scarce and their findings in-
conclusive. While some emphasize differences (Hurd, 2007, 2008; Hampton 2013),
others detect more similarities (Mandaville and Silvestri 2015; Wolff 2015).
A first glance at foreign policy approaches that directly address issues of religion
seems to confirm the divide. The United States, for example, started much ear-
lier than the European Union (EU) and its member states to promote religious
freedom worldwide. Already in 1998, the US Congress adopted the International
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Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), which made annual reporting on the situation of
religious freedom in the world mandatory for the US Department of State. For this
purpose, the latter established the Office of International Religious Freedom and
appointed an Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom whose ob-
jective is the monitoring of religious persecution and discrimination worldwide.1
Additionally, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)
was established as part of IRFA, “an independent, bipartisan U.S. federal govern-
ment commission, the first of its kind in the world, dedicated to defending the
universal right to freedom of religion or belief abroad.”2 In Europe, by contrast,
more than ten years later, a few EU member states established small offices and/or
introduced policies tasked with promoting religious freedom abroad; for example,
Italy and the Netherlands in 2009 and the UK in 2010 (Annicchino 2013; Veer
2014; Lindsay 2015). The EU adopted Guidelines on the Promotion and Protec-
tion of Freedom of Religion or Belief 3 in 2013, which, among other things, call on
EU missions to monitor respect for freedom of religion or belief in third countries.
Their reports, though, unlike in the case of the United States, are not public, and so
far, “no substantial change in policy practices is discernible” following the adoption
of the guidelines (Foret 2017, 19).4 In 2016, matching the Ambassador-at-Large in
the United States, the European Commission appointed a Special Envoy for the
promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU, who serves as special
adviser to the Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development.5
In addition, the US Department of State established the Office of Religion and
Global Affairs in 2014, which, headed by the Special Representative for Religion and
Global Affairs, works to implement the US Strategy on Religious Leader and Faith
Community Engagement, provides advice and analysis on foreign policy matters
related to religion, and engages in dialogue with religious actors.6 Although similar
institutions were established in a few EU member states; for example, France and
Germany (Germain 2014; Kreft 2015), and although in both, the EU and the United
States, training modules for diplomats on issues of religion were introduced (Bilde
2015; Wolff 2015), such offices remain rare in Europe, and no respective office
has been established within the European External Action Service (EEAS), which
functions as the EU’s main body for the management of its external affairs.
Reasons for the earlier and heightened awareness for issues of religious freedom
and religious engagement in US foreign policies compared to Europe may be man-
ifold, including stronger efforts of religious lobbies—although, supporters of these
policies have been active on both sides of the Atlantic (Hertzke 2004; Leustean
2011; Bolvin 2013; De Jong 2013; Wolff 2015). However, this article does not focus
on the exact causes of the described policy developments. I am more interested in
the bigger picture, namely the deeper discursive structures of foreign policy, which
enable and constrain political language and behavior.
Based on a quantitative content and qualitative predicate analysis of foreign pol-
icy documents, produced in the relationship with six religiously diverse states in
Sub-Sahara Africa (Central African Republic, Nigeria, Tanzania), East Asia (Indone-
sia, the Philippines), and the Middle East (Lebanon), I compare how religion is
represented in EU and US foreign policy to explore whether a transatlantic divide
exists. My results suggest that the foreign policies of both international actors are
1
For more information, see https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/ (accessed: June 22, 2017).
2
About USCIRF, see http://www.uscirf.gov/about-uscirf (accessed August 15, 2017).
3
The guidelines are available at https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/137585.pdf (accessed June 22, 2017).
4
The issue area of freedom of religion or belief, however, was included into the Annual reports on human rights and
democracy in the world, which have been issued by the European External Actions Service (EEAS) since 2009; and in 2016,
the Intergroup on Freedom of Religion or Belief and Religious Tolerance in the European Parliament (founded in 2015) started
to issue an Annual Report on the State of Freedom of Religion or Belief in the World.
5
Information available at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/special-envoy-jan-figel_en (accessed: June 22, 2017).
6
Information available at: https://www.state.gov/s/rga/ (accessed: June 22, 2017).
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based on a secular structure, but that of the EU is less accommodative toward reli-
gion than that of the United States, which also includes Islam. I do not claim that
these differences represent the main or even the only reason for the differences
in when and to what degree both international actors have introduced religious
freedom and religious engagement into their foreign policies. But I argue that they
help to develop a deeper understanding of why it has been easier for advocates of
international religious freedom and religious engagement policies in the United
States to institutionalize their concerns than in the EU.
These findings contribute to research on religion in foreign policy, which so far
has primarily focused either on the United States or the EU and has primarily been
based on survey research and elite interviews, by analyzing foreign policy documents
to systematically compare the representation of religion in EU and US foreign pol-
icy. Moreover, the findings are useful for furthering mutual understanding on both
sides of the Atlantic, which is important for jointly tackling international challenges
that might be arising from the growing political role of religion in other parts of
the world.
Before I continue, one further explanation is necessary: I focus here on the EU
rather than on a single European state to allow for a broader comparison between
Europe and the United States. The EU represents many of the interests of its mem-
ber states abroad. Either negotiated in an intergovernmental process (in case of its
foreign and security policy) or produced at the supranational level (in case of de-
velopment and external trade policies), EU external policies represent the smallest
common denominator all member states can agree to, despite their diverse histor-
ical experiences and foreign policy interests that they often also pursue indepen-
dently of the EU. Paraphrasing Smith (2014, 14), the main question, therefore, is
whether the accumulation of EU discourses distinguishes the EU from other inter-
national actors, such as the United States. But I do not analyze whether and to what
extent these EU discourses represent the individual discourse of any member state.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: The next section discusses
the role of secularism and religion in foreign policy and, drawing on the literature
on transatlantic issues, identifies domestic sources that potentially lead to differ-
ences in the secular structures of EU and US foreign policies. Subsequently, the
methodology is explained, which includes the discursive framework, the selection
of the included text corpus, and the description of the coding process. Next, the
empirical findings are presented, and, finally, their implications for future research
are discussed.
A Transatlantic Perspective on Religion and Secularism in Foreign Policy
Research on international relations and foreign policy analysis long neglected re-
ligion due to the deeply embedded assumption amongst most social scientists that
the political role of religion would decline over time. This assumption has changed
with “the global rise of religion’s political influence” since the 1960s and, primarily,
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, which “cleared the way for political sci-
entists to turn their analytical attention to this influence” (Philpott 2009, 192). Since
then, the literature on religion in foreign policy has grown considerably, particularly
with regard to the United States but also the EU. Studies that directly compare EU
and US foreign policy with respect to religion, however, are scarce and provide in-
conclusive answers to the question of whether there is a transatlantic divide in how
the EU and the US approach religion in their foreign policies. Some policy stud-
ies, for instance, observe a similar “secular bias” among diplomats on both sides of
the Atlantic (Mandaville and Silvestri 2015) and a convergence of approaches to
engage religious actors (Wolff 2015). Others focus more on differences. Hampton
(2013), for example, posits that differences in the social and political importance
of religion on both sides of the Atlantic facilitates varied perceptions of threat and
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security. Her argument goes that, since many—more religious—Americans still be-
lieve in the providential blessing of their nation and in fundamental evil that needs
to be wiped out, they tend to opt more easily for military force than their—less
religious—European counterparts. However, even though providing intriguing in-
sights in the impact of the “religious America–secular Europe” cliché on strategic
security cultures, Hampton does not really provide any clues on the question of
how the EU and the United States approach and represent religion in their foreign
policies.
More helpful in that regard is Hurd’s (2007, 2008) identification of two distinct
trajectories of secularism effective in European and American foreign policy: a
laicist tradition, which is based on a separationist narrative, in which religion is
expelled from politics, and a more accommodationist narrative with Christianity
and Judaism as unique bases of secular democracy. She argues that, even though
each understanding exists on both sides of the Atlantic, the EU tends more toward
the laicist trajectory, the United States more toward the Judeo-Christian one. These
prevailing narratives, according to Hurd, shape foreign policies. She argues, for
example, that “for laicists, Muslim-majority societies can be ‘modernized’ if, like
Turkey, they follow in the footsteps of their secular Western role models and en-
force the exclusion of religion from politics” (Hurd 2007, 357). For Judeo-Christian
secularists, by contrast, Islam would be incompatible with democracy and any sep-
aration between religion and politics, explaining, for instance, the adverse attitude
of the United States toward Iran. Even though there may exist more understandings
of the secular in international relations than the two identified by Hurd (Philpott
2009, 185), the frequent citation of her approach evidences its wide recognition,
and the distinction of two contrasting secularisms is particularly promising for the
matter at hand. Therefore, I use her work as a starting point. Primarily, I draw on
her understanding of secularism as discursive tradition and political authority to
assess whether and how the two distinct secular trajectories identified by her shape
how religion is represented in EU and US foreign policy.
Following Hurd (2007, 2008), I suggest that the foreign policies of the EU and
the United States are based on a secular structure because neither the EU nor the
United States are (formed of) religious states and they all understand themselves
as secular. Secularism, however, does not mean the absence of religion. To the con-
trary, “multiple secularisms” exist in democratic societies, which reflect different ar-
rangements that states have found to both bound and integrate religion (Bhargava
1998; Stepan 2011; Sheikh and Wæver 2012). As Fox (2015, 179) has shown in his
extensive study of political secularism worldwide, “true state neutrality on the issue
of religion is very much the exception rather than the norm,” and this also applies
to Europe and North America, where most states legislate religion in one way or
another. Therefore, I assume that the secular structures of foreign policies, rather
than being void of religion, reflect basic assumptions about religion and politics
held on both sides of the Atlantic. Transatlantic differences in these assumptions,
I argue, can be detected when considering how religion is represented in foreign
policy documents.
Such an analysis is not only useful for the transatlantic comparison. It also ad-
dresses the question of which specific form of secularism the EU draws on in its
relations with other states. The historical experiences of its member states with re-
spect to religion are diverse. They range from strict separation (e.g., in France) to
accommodation and close cooperation (e.g., in Germany) to establishment of re-
ligion (e.g., in the United Kingdom and in many Scandinavian countries) (Stepan
2011; Sheikh and Wæver 2012). Therefore, the EU chose to remain largely silent
on issues of religion until the 1990s, although religious actors and ideas, primarily
Catholic, had played an important role in promoting and shaping European inte-
gration (Philpott and Shah 2006). Major change came about with the Treaty of Lis-
bon, which, for the first time, formulated substantive norms on religion (Challand
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2009; Doe 2009; Mudrov 2016). Even though it leaves national church-state arrange-
ments in the competences of the member states, it prescribes “an open, transpar-
ent and regular dialogue” with churches and religious and philosophical noncon-
fessional organizations (art. 17). Willaime (2009), therefore, has pointed out that
the secular model of the EU should not be conflated with the French practice of
strict separation. Especially since the Treaty of Lisbon came into force in 2009, the
EU, according to Willaime, has shared characteristics of a cooperative model of
church-state relations, which, based on separation between political and religious
systems, recognizes the role of religion in the public sphere (similar Doe 2009, 157).
The question remains which of these understandings shape the EU’s relationship
with other states—its more laicist past, as assumed by Hurd, or its more cooperative
present, as pointed out by Willaime.
Similar questions appear in the context of American foreign policy. While some
claim that religion has an exceptionally prominent role in US foreign policy (e.g.,
Haynes 2009, 297–300), others identify a lack of engagement with religion in the
US Department of State, including the marginalization of the international reli-
gious freedom policy structure within the department (Albright 2006; Chaplin and
Joustra 2010; Johnston 2011; Farr 2013; Lindsay 2015, 258ff). In addition, there are
major differences between administrations that may be reflected in foreign policy
documents. For instance, the American presidents “George W. Bush and Barack
Obama represent two fundamentally different streams of the American religious
tradition” (Devuyst 2010, 36). While the former embodied the narrative consider-
ing America to be the “Chosen Nation”—that is, chosen by God—the latter rather
typified an opposing conception emphasizing a civil religion, which balances reli-
gion and politics and which is more inclusive toward non-Christian faiths (Williams
2013).
To build an analytical framework, the different roles that religion can potentially
play in foreign policy need to be considered. Religion can broadly be defined here
as consisting of “beliefs, actions and institutions which assume the existence of su-
pernatural entities with powers of action, or impersonal powers or processes pos-
sessed of moral purpose” (Bruce 2011, 112).7 These beliefs, actions, and institu-
tions can have diverse impacts on foreign policy; that is, on “the formal policies . . .
which affect various military, economic, humanitarian, social, and cultural dimen-
sions of [the] relations with other states and nonstate actors” (Warner and Walker
2011, 114). Drawing on Warner and Walker (2011) and on Sandal and Fox (2013,
12–29), who usefully summarize potential impacts of religion on foreign policy and
international relations, I identify four potential domestic sources that may mediate
how the United States and the EU approach religion in their foreign policies: re-
ligiosity of the population including its political leaders, institutional religion-state
relations, ideas about the appropriate relationship between religion and politics,
and religious tradition. This list of potential domestic sources for the transatlantic
secular divide in foreign policy is not exhaustive. But these four factors correspond
particularly well with insights from the literature on transatlantic differences con-
cerning religion, which is why I focus on them in the following empirical analysis.
Religiosity
One way how religion impacts foreign policy refers to the religious worldviews, atti-
tudes, and practices of political leaders and their constituents, whichmay shape how
foreign policies are formulated (Sandal and Fox 2013, 13ff.; Warner and Walker
2011, 123ff). One could, for example, assume that states whose societies are more
7
I am aware of the problem that there is no definition that universally and exhaustively defines religion in all
its respects. However, I agree with Bruce (2011, 118) that a “largely commonsensical conceptualization of religion is
sufficient to allow us to get on with our primary purpose of exploring its . . . interesting features.”
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religious assign more political importance to issues of religion, such as the pro-
tection of religious freedom and the engagement with religious actors, than those
whose members tend to be less religious. By extension, one could also assume that
there are more, and more influential, religious interest groups in more religious
societies.8 When comparing the prevalence of religious beliefs and practices in the
United States with those in Europe, it is safe to say that, overall, Americans are more
religious than Europeans, despite some geographical variation on both sides of the
Atlantic (Bös and Hebel 2007; Berger et al. 2008, 9ff; Pfaff 2008; Norris and In-
glehart 2011, 83ff). Indeed, it is common that US presidents openly refer to their
faith and use religious language to legitimize their foreign policies (Berggren and
Rae 2006; Inboden 2008; Devuyst 2010), which particularly attracts religious voters.
On the special case of the Iraq war, for example, Froese and Mencken (2009, 112)
demonstrate that, irrespective of party identity, “Americans who feel that their re-
ligious faith should be more influential in political matters have placed their trust
in President Bush and, in turn, lent their support to the Iraq War.” In Europe,
by contrast, invoking religion to legitimize foreign policies is relatively uncommon
(Hampton 2013). Consequently, one could expect that religion is also more preva-
lent in US foreign policy documents than in those issued by the EU. If this were the
case, it would reinforce the depiction of a “more religious America” and a “more
secular Europe” and the impact of this difference on foreign policy.
The Institutional Relationship between Religion and State
The access of organized religions and religious interest groups and parties, which
channel religious values and ideas into foreign policy, is shaped by institutional
structures, including those that regulate the religion-state relationship (Haynes
2009, 295; Warner and Walker 2011, 124). Drawing on the religion and politics lit-
erature, Warner and Walker (2011, 124), for instance, assume that “all other things
being equal, the overt influence of a religion in a state’s foreign policy may be lower
in a state in which there is high differentiation through a formal, legal separation of
religious and state authority” because religious actors and values lack formal access
to politics and the state. Considering that in Europe religion and state are in most
countries less strictly separated than in the United States (Fox 2015), andWillaime’s
(2009) already-mentioned claim that the EU shares characteristics of a cooperative
model of church-state relations rather than strict separation, one would arrive at a
completely different expectation than the one explicated above. One would expect
that the “wall of separation” between religion and state that is stipulated in the First
Amendment of the US constitution restricts, if not formally then at least discur-
sively, the extent to which the foreign policy administration can focus on issues of
religion. Lindsay (2015), for example, in her comparison of religion in US and UK
foreign policy detects that, despite the more religious civil culture in the United
States, its foreign policy bureaucracy, due to the constitutional precept of separa-
tion of religion and state, is more hesitant to engage with issues of religion than the
bureaucracy in the UK with its established religion. This could mean for the analysis
here that, even though the United States actively promotes international religious
freedom and engagement with religious actors, beyond these specific policies reli-
gion is as much, or as little, present in foreign policy documents as in those issued
by the EU. If this alternative expectation was confirmed by the empirical analysis, it
would seriously challenge the “religious America—secular Europe” cliché and sug-
gest that religiosity of the population and political leaders is a less significant, or at
least not the only factor, that determines howmuch importance international actors
assign to religion in their foreign policies.
8
On religious interest groups, see for example Hertzke (2009) on the United States and Leustean (2011) on the EU.
However, no comparative research on their relative strength exists yet, making it difficult to substantiate this assumption.
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Ideas about the Appropriate Relationship between Religion and Politics
The relationship between religion and state, however, is not only a legal question.
As Hurd (2007, 2008) stresses, secularism is a discursive tradition that is nurtured by
ideas on where the line between religion and politics should be drawn. Such ideas
on what constitutes the appropriate relationship between religion and politics are
also incorporated into the secular structure of foreign policies (Warner and Walker
2011, 120).
Several scholars have identified major differences in how the appropriate rela-
tionship between religion and politics is understood on both sides of the Atlantic.
As already mentioned, much of this literature focuses on the differences between
specifically French, rather than European, and US secularism. Stepan (2011), for
example, points out that French laicism is based on the “clerically hostile form of
freedom of the state from religion,” while US secularism is a “clerically friendly
form of freedom of religion from the federal state.” Accordingly, Kuru (2007, 571)
distinguishes two forms of secularism: On the one hand, “assertive secularism,” pre-
vailing for instance in France, means “that the state excludes religion from the pub-
lic sphere and plays an ‘assertive’ role as the agent of a social engineering project
that confines religion to the private realm.” On the other hand, “passive secularism
. . . requires that the secular state play a ‘passive’ role in avoiding the establish-
ment of any religion” and is more influential in the United States. Berger et al.
(2008, 126), similarly, differentiate a “hard” from a “soft” version of separation pre-
dominating in Europe and the United States, respectively. These differences match
Hurd’s (2008) suggestion of a laicist, or separationist, trajectory of secularism pre-
dominating in Europe and a more accommodationist one in the United States. The
question remains whether insights gained from arrangements prevailing in France
can be extrapolated to the EU level.
The mentioned authors share the assumption that differing understandings of
secularism have political implications. One major consequence usually stressed is
that the public expression of religiosity in the United States is more protected than
in many parts of Europe, where controversies about religious practices and symbols
have more often been solved in favor of an ejection of religion from official pub-
lic spheres (Pew Research Center 2012). Accordingly, religion in the United States
is often “seen as a resource (the means by which to resolve secular as well as reli-
gious dilemmas); in Europe, it is part of the problem” (Berger et al. 2008, 126).
These different views correspond with Philpott’s (2007) reasoning about religion’s
ambivalent role in politics. There are religious actors who support democracy and
counter violence and others who do the opposite. The differences discussed in the
transatlantic literature suggest that US foreign policy focuses more on the “posi-
tive” role that religion can play in other countries, while the EU concentrates more
on religion’s “negative” role, justifying why it should remain strictly separated from
politics.
Religious Tradition
Religious tradition refers to the specific culture that shapes the identity of an in-
ternational actor, which in turn may affect how this actor defines its foreign policy
interests (Sandal and Fox 2013, 28ff.; Warner and Walker 2011, 120). Some of the
literature on religion in foreign policy has focused on the impact of differences be-
tween denominations, including between different Christian groups; for example,
on the general orientation of US foreign policy (Guth 2013), on US policy toward
the Middle East (Oldmixon, Rosenson, and Wald 2005; Baumgartner, Fancia, and
Morris 2008; Collins et al. 2010), or on European integration (Boomgaarden and
Freire 2009; Minkenberg, 2009, 2012; Nelsen and Guth 2015). Another question on
religious tradition is how Europe’s and America’s Christian heritage shapes their
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relations with other faiths, such as Islam, which often is constructed as the main
“other” of both the EU and the United States (Hurd, 2007, 2008; Challand 2009;
Smith 2009). To the question of whether there is a transatlantic difference in that
regard, one finds no clear response in the literature. Hurd’s (2007, 2008) assertion
of a prevailing Judeo-Christian trajectory of secularism in US foreign policy suggests
a more critical stance toward Islam in US than in EU foreign policy. Others, such
as Berger, Davie, and Fokas, argue that due to the predominating separationist no-
tion of secularism in Europe, religion is, as mentioned, primarily seen as a problem
and even “more so, whether fairly or not, with reference to Islam” (2008, 126). In
contrast, the United States’ approach of “passive secularism . . . allows for the pub-
lic visibility of religion” (Kuru 2007, 571), which also includes Islam and therefore
implies a more “positive” view of Islam than is prevalent in Europe.
Similar diverging views can be found on Christianity. Hurd’s (2008) differenti-
ation between a laicist and a Judeo-Christian trajectory of secularism in EU and
US foreign policy, respectively, implies a more positive or protective representation
of Christianity and Christians in US foreign policy (whereas, according to the Eu-
ropean narrative, religion should be expelled from politics altogether). The exist-
ing Christian heritage of the EU, as emphasized for instance by Philpott and Shah
(2006), by contrast, suggests more similarities between EU and the United States
with respect to Christianity’s representation.
Assessing whether the representation of Islam and Christianity is more or less
critical in EU than in US foreign policy documents will contribute to addressing
these contradictions in the transatlantic literature.
Methodology
This study draws on a discursive framework to compare how religion is represented
in EU and US foreign policy documents. It complements previous research that
has primarily used public opinion and other survey data (e.g., Baumgartner et al.
2008; Boomgaarden and Freire 2009; Froese andMencken 2009; Guth 2013; Nelsen
and Guth 2015; Foret 2017) and elite interviews (Lindsay 2015; Mandaville and
Silvestri 2015; Wolff 2015; Foret 2017) to study the role of religion in American and
European foreign policy. Studying foreign policy documents has the advantage that
it is not limited by preset questions that often make data sets incomparable or by
social desirability bias or lack of access to interlocutors. It enables the researcher to
lay bare themacrostructures underlying day-to-day foreign policy practices. Previous
discursive studies on religion in EU and US foreign policy, however, have focused
only on the United States (Berggren and Rae 2006; Devuyst 2010) or on the EU
(Larsen 2014) or do not inform the reader about the text corpus used (Hurd 2008).
Discourses can be understood as “structures of signification which construct so-
cial realities” (Milliken 1999, 229). They refer to “the space where human beings
make sense of the material world, where they attach meaning to the world and
where representations of the world become manifest” (Holzscheiter 2014, 144).
Discourses do not determine what political actors do, but they constrain their lan-
guage and political behavior. Therefore, reconstructing discursive structures does
not aim at explaining details of foreign policies; for example, the exact causes of
why the EU and the United States adopted policies on international religious free-
dom and religious engagement. Rather, discourse-analytical efforts aspire to identify
“significative practices and the knowledge systems underlying them” (Milliken 1999,
236). In the case at hand, this means reconstructing how religion is represented in
EU and US foreign policy documents to uncover and compare deeply held attitudes
and interpretations.
To make the text corpus comparable, I focus on documents that were produced
in the relationship of the EU and the United States with six other states: Nige-
ria, Tanzania, and the Central African Republic (CAR), as well as Indonesia, the
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Philippines, and Lebanon. The country selection is primarily used to focus the
transatlantic comparison. The analysis does not aim at evaluating the EU’s and the
United States’ roles in these countries. The six countries were selected for three
reasons: First, to make sure that religion appears in the documents of the two secu-
lar international actors at all, countries were chosen in which religious groups have
played a significant political role. Second, to make sure that the analysis can focus
on the representations of Islam and Christianity, countries were chosen in which
these two are the largest denominations. The six states belong to the religiously
most diverse countries in the world. In half of them, Muslims constitute the major-
ity (87.2 percent in Indonesia, 54 percent in Lebanon, and 50 percent in Nigeria);
in the other half, Christians represent the largest group (92.5 percent in the Philip-
pines, 61.4 percent in Tanzania, and 50 percent in the Central African Republic).
In all, the respective other religion—that is, Christianity or Islam—represents the
largest minority.9 This composition is important for the analysis here because it
seeks to compare EU and US views on their “own” religion abroad (i.e., Catholic
and Protestant Christianity) as well as their main “other” (Islam). This is the main
reason why I desisted from including some of the “usual suspects” when thinking
about religion and foreign policy, such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi-Arabia, or Israel, or
emerging powers, such as China, India, or Russia, because they either are religiously
homogenous—Muslim-majority—states or they consist of large groups of neither
Muslim nor Catholic/Protestant affiliation. Both would hamper the comparison
between representations of “own” and main “other” religion. Third, to allow for
some variation I included countries with protracted violent conflicts in relation to
religion as well as some which have widely been perceived as peaceful democracies,
despite their religious diversity and occasional and/or regional violent incidents
(Indonesia, Tanzania). Additionally, to challenge the dominant public image of ag-
gressive Muslims and peaceful Christians, I included a country which saw attacks by
Christians against Muslims (CAR).
I retrieved the documents from websites of the EU (EUR-Lex, Council of the
European Union, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, the European Commission’s press database, and the European Parliament)
and of the United States (White House, Department of State, and US Congress).
I first selected all documents between 2001 and 2015 with one of the six country
names in the title or which dealt exclusively with one of these countries. I only in-
cluded documents representing an institutional position to avoid distortion due to
individual opinions.10 The time frame allows for the comparison between the time
before and after the Treaty of Lisbon came into force in 2009, and between the
Bush Jr. and the Obama administrations (the cut-off date was December 31, 2015,
to avoid distortions due to the heated election campaigns in 2016). Earlier time pe-
riods, unfortunately, could not be included due to a lack of access to a comparable
number of US documents from previous administrations.11 In total, this made 1,684
documents (EU: 872, US: 812).
9
CIA World Fact Book (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/, accessed: January 7, 2017).
10
Therefore, parliamentary questions and responses to them were excluded, as well as statements by journalists
or representatives from other states in interviews or joint speeches. Documents simply announcing upcoming events,
visits, and press availabilities were not included; documents reporting on these were. Statements by EU delegations,
US embassies, and the US Mission to the UN were only included if posted on the mentioned websites of EU and US
institutions. Their own websites were excluded for practical reasons because they did not provide access to documents
from the entire time frame under investigation. Documents from the European Court of Justice and the European
Investment Bank published on the mentioned EU websites were excluded due to a lack of corresponding documents on
the American side. Regular reports were also excluded to avoid a distortion of the results due to the extensive reporting
system of the United States (e.g., on religious freedom worldwide) that is not matched by a similarly extensive system
on the part of the EU.
11
Only the most important US foreign policy documents are archived.
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After collecting the documents, I first identified, based on a list of thirty-four key
words, the documents that mentioned religion for further analysis.12 To compare
the quantitative presence of religion in EU and US foreign policy discourse, I cal-
culated for each side the share of documents mentioning religion in relation to the
total number of documents.
For the qualitative analysis, I adapted Milliken’s discourse analytical method of
predicate analysis, which “focuses on the language practices of predication—the
verbs, adverbs and adjectives that attach to nouns. Predications of a noun construct
the thing(s) named as a particular sort of thing, with particular features and ca-
pacities” (Milliken 1999, 232). The “thing” whose representation is reconstructed
here is religion. However, in foreign policy documents, religion is not only referred
to as a noun but also as an adjective to label other nouns; for example, “religious
conflict” or “interfaith dialogue.” Therefore, I broadened the focus to include also
nouns to which religion is attached as an adjective as they also shed light on how
religion’s role is interpreted. As can be seen in the following analysis, foreign pol-
icy actors and administrations on both sides of the Atlantic hesitate to discuss the
political role of religion in length in their documents. In most cases, religion is
mentioned in passing. Therefore, predicate analysis lends itself as the most suitable
method because it allows for an assessment of how religion is constructed through
predication, even though it is not elaborated on in length.
The coding proceeded as follows: Each mention of religion (as noun or as ad-
jective, based on the thirty-four key words) in the documents was coded according
to whether predications (corresponding adjectives or nouns) carried a negative or
a positive connotation; that is, the mention was coded as “problem” if religion was
framed as something contributing to a problem (e.g., to violence or to discrimina-
tion), as “resource” if framed as contributing to solving problems (e.g., religious
leaders who condemn human rights violations), or as “neutral” if no such tendency
could be detected. Afterward, I calculated the number of occurrences of each fram-
ing and assessed for each document whether it tended more toward represent-
ing religion as “problem” or as “resource” or in a “neutral” manner (if “neutral”
descriptions predominated or “problem” and “resource” framings balanced each
other out). In a similar manner, I assessed for each document separately how Islam
(and related terms, such as Muslim, mosque, etc.) and Christianity (and related
terms, such as Christian, church, etc.) were represented—that is, in a rather critical
way (e.g., as a perpetrator of violence and discrimination) or in a more positive or
protective way, (e.g., as a contributor to peace or as a victim to be protected from
violence and discrimination). Again, I ascertained the tendency of the whole doc-
ument (i.e., more critical, more appreciative, or neutral). The subsequent transat-
lantic comparisons, thus, used the documents as units of analysis, rather than single
sentences or words.
In a nod to debates on transatlantic differences with respect to foreign policy pref-
erences, which emphasize the EU’s inclination toward civilian, nonviolent measures
and the promotion of human rights and the rule of law in opposition to the United
States’ focus on military security (Manners 2002; Smith 2014, 204f), I additionally
coded the documents with respect to the contexts in which religion was mentioned
(e.g., security, human rights, development, democracy/democratization, and oth-
ers). Afterward, I prepared a ranking for each document to assess whether there
are transatlantic differences and similarities with respect to the contexts in which
religion is primarily represented.
12
Sole appearance in names, such as Fatah al Islam or Moro Islamic Liberation Front, was not considered a refer-
ence to religion.
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Table 1. Proportions of documents that include references to religion (percent)
EU
(01–15)
US
(01–15)
EU
(01–08)
EU
(09–15)
US
(01–08)
US
(09–15)
All 14.91 21.55 10.80 17.69 23.73 20.31
CAR 21.25 27.06 0.00 26.77 7.69 30.56
Nigeria 39.17 26.71 47.22 35.71 21.43 27.97
Tanzania 7.41 12.05 5.56 8.89 23.33 5.66
Lebanon 8.85 13.68 9.84 7.69 14.39 12.50
Indonesia 7.94 34.29 4.35 11.34 40.58 30.19
Philippines 8.33 12.61 9.09 7.94 39.13 5.68
Religion in EU and US Foreign Policy Documents
In the theoretical considerations above, I identified a series of rival expectations on
the relative prominence and representation of religion in general, and of Islam and
Christianity specifically, in EU and US foreign policy documents. In the following
section, I present the findings of the analysis on each of these expectations, to assess
whether there is evidence for a transatlantic divide or not.
Prominence of Religion
One expectation that followed from the differing prevalence of religiosity on both
sides of the Atlantic was that issues of religion were more prominent in US than
in EU foreign policy documents. When considering religion-state arrangements, by
contrast, one would expect that the representation of religion is quite restricted in
US foreign policy and, therefore, not more prominent than in EU foreign policy.
At first glance, the analysis of the documents confirms the expectation that reli-
gion is more present in US foreign policy documents than in those of the EU (by a
bit more than six percentage points) (table 1, first two columns, first row).
This difference even increases to almost nine percentage points when consid-
ering that foreign policy decision-making is a preserve of executive bodies (21.02
percent of their documents contain references to religion in the United States, com-
pared to 12.18 percent in the EU). However, the appearances of religion are often
very brief. If one removes all documents where religion is only mentioned in pass-
ing (i.e., once or twice in just one sentence), the difference shrinks considerably
to 6.58 percent for the EU and 10.51 percent for the United States. This suggests
that the attention for issues of religion within executive bodies is relatively low and
does not differ considerably on both sides of the Atlantic, whereas the attention
for issues of religion is primarily driven by the legislatures, particularly in the EU
(58.82 percent of the European Parliament’s documents and 29.41 percent of US
congressional documents mention religion).
The comparison of different time periods in the EU and the United States
(table 1, last four columns) confirms the assumption that religion overall has be-
come more prominent in foreign policy discourses after the Treaty of Lisbon and
that it was more prominent under the Bush Jr. administration than under Obama.
Attention for issues of religion, in addition, is driven by specific US and EU inter-
ests, as well as by dynamics in the target countries. In case of Indonesia, for instance,
US diplomats used their good relations with the country to emphasize their good
relations with Islam or, in other words, to controvert their allegedly negative view
of Islam after 9/11. Many documents stress that Indonesia is the largest Muslim
democracy in the world, demonstrating that Islam and democracy are no contra-
diction in terms. EU-Indonesia relations, by contrast, are based primarily on trade,
in which religion has not been considered an important element. In Nigeria, by
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contrast, EU institutions focused a lot on prominent human rights cases that the
United States were less vocal about, such as the case of Amina Lawal who was sen-
tenced to death by stoning for adultery by Sharia courts in a northern state of Nige-
ria.13 With the rise of Boko Haram, the foci of the United States and the EU con-
verged, but Nigeria remained a country where the EU is especially aware of issues of
religion. In CAR, clashes between Muslim fighters and Christian militias led to the
displacement of large parts of the civil population as well as acts of reprisal against
the Muslim minority, explaining why attention for issues of religion in CAR jumped
up in 2013. Similar cycles of attention can be related, in Lebanon, to the assassina-
tion of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 and the subsequent Cedar Revolution
and to Israeli airstrikes following a series of rocket attacks and raids into Israeli ter-
ritory by Hezbollah in 2006, as well as, in the Philippines, to highs and lows of the
conflict between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front between
2000 and the preliminary peace agreement in 2012.
In conclusion, the numbers suggest that religion is not a top priority either of
the EU nor of the US foreign policy administration. Even though there is some
difference, one can hardly argue that religion is a lot more present in US than in
EU foreign policy documents. Even quite the opposite is the case if one looks sep-
arately at the legislatures. This result challenges the assumption that higher levels
of societal religiosity translate into higher levels of attention for religion in foreign
policy. Religious actors may be able to push some of their specific projects onto
the foreign policy agenda, as the evangelical movement in the United States did
with the International Religious Freedom Act and a few other acts (Hertzke 2004;
Haynes 2009, 299); and more overtly religious authorities, such as George W. Bush,
may give more utterance to faith than less overtly religious authorities (see also
Devuyst 2010). Overall, however, foreign policy administrations on both sides of the
Atlantic seem to be similarly hesitant to actively engage with religion, confirming
the “secular bias” under which both operate, previously emphasized by Mandaville
and Silvestri (2015, 3).
Religion: Problem or Resource?
Another expectation identified above considered differing ideas about the appro-
priate relationship between religion and politics on both sides of the Atlantic, which
would result in religion being represented primarily as a problem in EU foreign pol-
icy and more often as a resource in US documents. The analysis, indeed, confirms
this expectation.
As mentioned, references to religion in EU and US foreign policy documents are
usually very brief. There is hardly any explicit discussion of the role of religion in the
six included countries. However, the predicates and nouns associated with religion
(or related terms) give some indication of how the role of religion is interpreted.
The EU as well as the United States, when representing religion as a problem, pri-
marily do so in the context of violence: tensions and attacks where violent conflict
persists, and terrorism and separatism in countries where terrorist and separatist
groups are active. Both also stress problems of religious intolerance, extremism, fun-
damentalism, and radicalization. From time to time they both underline, though,
that religion cannot, and should not, be blamed for violence and terrorism. When
representing religion as a resource, both primarily highlight the role and poten-
tial of religious leaders and groups in promoting peace, human rights, and inter-
faith dialogue and cooperation and mention religion in the context of reconcilia-
tion, respect, and moderation. Furthermore, they sometimes emphasize religious
diversity as a strength that encourages tolerance and peaceful coexistence. Such
13
It has to be noted here that the United States did mention this case in its human rights reports but not in any
document that represented US -Nigeria day-to-day relations.
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Figure 1. Proportions of documents (2001–2015) predominantly framing religion as a
problem or a resource (percent).
“negative” and “positive” representations of religion can be found in both EU and
US foreign policy documents. However, in EU documents, those with a negative
connotation prevail, whereas in US documents those carrying a positive connota-
tion can be found much more often (figure 1).
When looking at the six country cases separately, it is the existence of violence
that drives up critical references to religion. This becomes particularly clear when
comparing the cases of Tanzania and Nigeria. Tanzania and Nigeria belong to the
religiously most diverse countries worldwide (with about equal shares of Muslims
and Christians), but Tanzania is a rather peaceful democracy, despite occasional in-
cidents of religious intolerance, and Nigeria is a country torn by protracted conflict
and violence. This is reflected in the documents, with Tanzania being the only of
the six countries where even the EU issued more documents with more “positive”
references to religion than critical ones (50 percent versus 33 percent), and Nige-
ria the only country in which even the United States issued more critical documents
(35.90 percent) than appreciative ones (33.33 percent).
Another transatlantic difference is that the EU and the United States, even
though both predominantly frame religion as a security issue, then diverge with
respect to the other contexts. For the EU, religion is primarily a security issue
(62.31 percent of its documents frame religion predominantly in the context of
security), secondly a human rights issue (34.62 percent), and only marginally an
issue of democratization (8.46 percent) and development (6.15 percent). For the
United States as well, religion is mainly a security issue (53.14 percent), secondly
though an issue of democracy (20.57 percent) and development (16.00 percent),
and only marginally a human rights issue (6.29 percent).14 The latter supports the
contention that the United States’ international religious freedom policy—that is,
a policy that is explicitly framed as a human rights policy—lacks practical influence
in American foreign-policy making.
In sum, the EU represents religion primarily as a problem for security—for in-
stance, as a contributing factor in violent conflicts and terrorism—and as a problem
for human rights, especially of religious minorities (such as in Indonesia) and of
women and girls, and in the context of harsh punishment (both particularly in Nige-
ria) and freedom of expression (emphasized primarily in the case of Lebanon). The
14
The numbers do not add up to 100% here because, on the one hand, there were some other, here not reported,
contexts; on the other hand, some documents framed religion in two different contexts equally (e.g., three references
to religion in the context of security and three in the context of human rights within the same document). These
documents then counted equally toward the ranking based on both contexts.
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Table 2. Proportions of documents with mainly critical or positive/protective references to Islam and
Christianity (percent) (“neutral” or “absent” not displayed)
EU US
2001–15 2001–08 2009–15 2001–15 2001–08 2009–15
Islam critical 24.62 47.37 15.22 10.29 17.14 5.71
Islam positive 19.23 7.89 23.91 34.86 30.00 38.10
Christianity critical 3.85 7.89 2.17 2.86 1.43 3.81
Christianity positive 18.46 15.79 19.57 22.86 17.14 26.67
United States, by contrast, represents religion more often as a resource for dialogue
and reconciliation, democratization, civil society and community development, the
provision of education and public health (especially HIV/Aids prevention15), and
as inspiration for humanitarianism, for example, in the context of disaster relief.
These findings confirm that differing understandings of the appropriate relation-
ship between religion and politics on both sides of the Atlantic have a bearing on
how the EU and the United States represent religion in their foreign policies. They
also suggest that the EU, though consisting of member states with different religion-
state arrangements and historical experiences, is guided in its foreign policies by an
understanding of religion as primarily fueling conflict and violence when mingling
with politics—a notion that has not lost ground since the Treaty of Lisbon came
into force, even though it advocates a more cooperative relationship with religion.
Representations of Islam and Christianity
Finally, I identified several rival expectations on how the representation of Islam and
Christianity in EU and US documents might differ. What the analysis reveals is that
EU documents are more critical of Islam than US documents, while US documents
are a bit more protective of Christianity than those of the EU.
First of all, however, it is notable that especially the EU, but also the United States,
largely refrain from explicitly referring to any specific faith in their foreign policy
documents. More than half of all documents of the EU that refer to religion do not
mention terms related to Islam (51.54 percent) or to Christianity (73.08 percent)
at all; almost as many in the case of the United States (45.14 percent and 69.71
percent, respectively). One can only speculate that this has to do with the inclina-
tion of diplomats to avoid accusations of bias toward one religion or another. With
respect to the rest of the documents, 24.62 percent of all EU documents analyzed
here include more critical than positive references to Islam, while in the case of the
United States this concerns only 10.29 percent (table 2, first column for EU and
United States each).
As can be seen in table 2, EU and US discourses have become less critical of Is-
lam and more protective of Christianity over time. This may be a reflection of the
increasing politicization of Islam in international relations, rendering Western ac-
tors more cautious in their public utterances about Islam in an attempt to prevent
or reconcile conflict. But the frequent attacks on Christians in many parts of the
world have also augmented concerns in the West about their security and protec-
tion, explaining the uptick in protective references to Christianity in the analyzed
documents.
In the United States, however, this is also a reflection of President Bush’s more
critical stance toward Islam. Foreign policy documents have become less critical
under Obama, with just 5.71 percent of documents representing Islam primarily in
15
Under the Bush Jr. administration, however, this did not mean education on safe sex and contraception, it rather
meant the encouragement of abstinence until marriage.
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a critical light, as opposed to 17.14 percent under Bush Jr. Even though Bush tried
to counter accusations of being hostile toward Islam (“I hear the language about
the United States, that United States is anti-Islam. It’s just not true. We view Islam as
a religion of peace” [Bush 2008]), he also coined terms like “Islamo-fascism” (Bush
2006), which, in linking Islam with fascism, has a very negative connotation.
There is quite some variation in the EU’s and the United States’ notions of Islam
according to country, which primarily reflects domestic developments: both, for
instance, are most critical of Islam in the documents on Nigeria and the Philippines,
where Islamist groups have been responsible for terrorism and violent insurgencies,
and more positive in the cases of CAR (with a Muslim minority under attack) and
Indonesia (as Muslim democracy). The United States, in addition, is quite critical
of Islam in Lebanon, where Hezbollah operates—even more so than the EU—and
positive in the case of Tanzania, a relatively peaceful country where a large part
of the population is Muslim. This suggests that the domestic security situation has
more of an impact on the representation of different faith groups than the general
attitude toward a specific group.
Conclusions
Studying foreign policy documents is a promising way to identify and compare dis-
cursive structures that enable and constrain foreign policies. The comparison of
how religion is represented in EU and US foreign policy documents reveals similar-
ities and differences. On the one hand, the occurrence of religion, despite slight dif-
ferences, is rather similar, and rather scarce when just considering executive bodies,
which are more influential in foreign policy making than—the more attentive (to
religion)—legislatures. On the other hand, EU and US foreign policy documents
differ profoundly in how they represent religion. While the EU perceives religion
primarily as a problem, especially for security and human rights, the United States
portrays religion much more often as a resource for security, democratization, and
development. Similarly, the document analysis reveals that the EU is more critical
toward Islam than the United States.
Without claiming that these differences in the discursive structures constitute the
main explanation for foreign policy differences on both sides of the Atlantic, they
still help developing a deeper understanding for the question of why it is much
more difficult for supporters of religious freedom and engagement policies in the
EU to find a sympathetic ear than in the United States. If dominant discourses
suggest that religion is a problem rather than a resource, it is much more likely that
demands for promoting the freedom of religious communities and for engaging
with them are turned down.
These findings, furthermore, allow a more nuanced view on the “religious
America-secular Europe” cliché and its effects on foreign policy. Unlike sometimes
assumed, transatlantic differences with respect to religion do not determine how
much importance EU and US foreign policy authorities attach to religion, but they
shape how religion is represented. Thus, the findings challenge the assumption that
more prevalence of religiosity in the United States would directly translate into
more attention for issues of religion in US foreign policy, although more overtly
religious actors can leave their mark in foreign policy documents, as illustrated by
the comparison between the Bush and the Obama administration. Yet, the docu-
ment analysis rather supports observations of a secular bias among Western diplo-
mats similar on both sides of the Atlantic, in the United States further reinforced by
the constitutional precept of strict separation of religion and state (Lindsay 2015),
which Mandaville and Silvestri (2015, 3) interpret as “major impediment to making
sense of religion in the world today and for integrating greater attention to reli-
gion in the foreign policy process.” At the same time, the findings support reason-
ings about transatlantic differences, such as those put forward by Hurd (2008), that
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imply that US foreign policy is nurtured by accommodationist ideas and EU foreign
policy based on separationist notions. Despite the diversity of religion-state relations
in EUmember states, the representation of religion in EU foreign policy documents
indeed reveals separationist ideas: After all, religion is perceived primarily as con-
tributing to conflict and strife if mingling with politics. This implies the idea that it
would be better to separate religion from politics if security and human rights are to
be protected. With respect to Islam, though, my findings challenge Hurd’s (2007,
2008) assertion that the Judeo-Christian basis of American secularism would ren-
der foreign policy particularly hostile toward Islam in other countries. They rather
support views that American secularism is more accommodative toward all religions
(e.g., Kuru 2007), including Islam, which is also reflected in foreign policy.
On a more general note, the foreign policies of secular international actors can
be characterized by differing representations of religion. These interpretations are
nurtured by domestic sources, such as norms and attitudes deeply held by foreign
policy bureaucrats as well as legal and discursive precepts on the appropriate rela-
tionship between religion and politics. In addition, as the analysis also shows, atten-
tion for issues of religion and the representation of religion in general, and Islam
in particular, are further mediated by dynamics within target states.
More research is needed to assess the reliability of the findings of this study.
The comparison could be expanded by including, for instance, foreign policy
documents on states with additional religious majorities (e.g., Israel, India, or
Myanmar), on some usual, religiously less pluralistic, “suspects” (e.g., Iran, Saudi-
Arabia, Turkey), or some major powers (e.g., China or Russia) to corroborate or
modify the findings. A comparison of pre- and post-9/11, not possible in this study
for practical reasons, would be another valuable addition. The most interesting
question for future research, however, would be to explore more in-depth how ex-
actly the identified different secular structures and representations of religion on
both sides of the Atlantic shape the implementation of foreign policies by the EU
and the United States, and how these structures interact with other factors, such as
the strategies of religious lobbies or the individual religiosity of policy-makers. Such
an analysis, however, would go beyond studying discourse and include other struc-
tural and agency factors to further expand knowledge about the role of religion in
American and European foreign policy.
Supplemental Information
Supplemental information is available at the Foreign Policy Analysis data archive.
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